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In this paper we discuss misbehavior detection for ve-
hicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs), a special case of
cyber-physical systems (CPSs). We evaluate the suitabil-
ity of existing PKI approaches for insider misbehavior
detection and propose a classification for novel detection
schemes.
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are digital systems
that are closely embedded into the physical world with
which they interact through sensors and actuators. In
contrast to classical embedded systems, they often form
networks with a large number of sensor or actuator
devices. These devices sense information, process it in a
distributed system, and then influence the physical world
using actuators. Notable examples of CPS are wireless
sensor networks (WSNs), smart factories, distributed e-
Health systems, and VANETs. In this paper, we focus
on VANETs, which are a prime example for CPS and
will soon be deployed on a large scale.
Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) are networks
that are created by equipping vehicles with wireless
transmission equipment. VANETs offer great potential
to improve road safety and to provide information and
entertainment applications for drivers and passengers.
Due to the unique properties of VANETs, this type of
network has attracted many researchers, including those
in the domain of security. The security challenges in
VANETs include the requirement for strong privacy,
the computationally constrained environment, and the
ephemeral nature of connectivity.
VANETs and other CPSs share a number of charac-
teristics that require fundamentally new approaches for
security, which differ from existing IT security require-
ments.
• Critical usage scenarios. CPSs often control sys-
tems where failure or malfunction may have severe
consequences, including massive financial loss or
loss of lives. Often, these systems fall under the
term critical infrastructures (CI). VANETs are one
example where failure or malfunction may lead
to massive congestion with subsequent delays and
financial losses or even to accidents with loss of
lives in a worst case.
• No clear security perimeter. In many of these
systems, there is no clear boundary between insiders
and outsiders. Instead, the logically and physically
distributed nature of CPSs leads to unclear security
perimeters and possible insider attacks. VANETs
are again a core example, as such networks are co-
operatively formed by vehicles and road-side equip-
ment. As vehicles are under distributed ownership
and control, it needs to be assumed that some of
the vehicles are under full control of attackers.
• Limited physical security. As nodes in CPSs are
often distributed in a potentially hostile environ-
ment, they may be subject to hijacking, analysis,
and reprogramming by attackers. Due to cost con-
straints, the protection against such hijacking is
often limited. A typical example is a Wireless Sen-
sor Network for environmental monitoring, where
nodes may be scattered randomly in the environ-
ment. Due to the long lifetime of vehicles, similar
challenges can be found in both VANETs and in-
vehicle networks.
• Sensor values as security assets. The primary
security assets in CPS are the sensor values and the
actuators controlled based on this input. Spoofing
and manipulation of sensor data are thus primary
attack vectors. For instance, in a VANET that is
used for detecting traffic jams, an attacker may
want to suppress certain sensor readings that would
indicate a traffic jam, or inject sensor values that
indicate a traffic jam where none exists.
In summary, CPSs, and VANETs in particular, will
likely attract attackers that try to manipulate sensed data
and influence the resulting actions taken by the system.
Such attackers may participate as regular network entities
either because attackers can easily join the VANET or
hijack already participating nodes. Once an attacker has
entered the VANET, she can easily inject spoofed infor-
mation into the VANET and trigger incorrect behavior.
From the perspective of the VANET, this attacker can be
seen as a misbehaving node that is sending incorrect data.
In addition to information injection and manipulation,
other attack types are conceivable, such as compromising
routing efficiency by not forwarding information for
other nodes. In this paper, we focus on detection of
information manipulation. Note we cannot necessarily
distinguish whether information manipulation is due to
malicious intent or due to faulty hardware. However,
from an information quality perspective, the resulting
countermeasures should arguably often be the same.
Classical IT security mechanisms, like encryption,
signatures, access control, (signature-based) intrusion
detection systems, and so forth, are not suitable to
thwart such insider attacks. Instead, we need security
mechanisms that can identify misbehavior, identify the
misbehaving node, and react either by filtering out the
incorrect data or excluding the misbehaving node from
further participation in the VANET. Research on security
in VANETs has already developed several novel ideas for
these tasks, many of which align with the goals of other
CPSs.
Golle et al. [1] propose a method to detect misbehavior
as we defined it above in the context of VANETs.
Instead of placing trust in nodes – as often done by
classical cryptographic authentication mechanisms –, the
proposed approach is to gain confidence in correctness of
data by analyzing the local information base and deriving
most probable explanations. During the following years,
more research was done that proposes comparable mis-
behavior detection mechanisms for VANETs. Examples
of these include [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], and [8].
There are fundamentally different approaches to mis-
behavior detection that can be used for a categorization
of different mechanisms as shown in Figure 1. A first
distinction is whether mechanisms focus on data values
contained in messages or on the node sending the mes-
sages. Node-centric mechanisms require authentication
mechanisms to reliably distinguish between different
nodes. Many systems achieve this by assuming a trusted
third party like a PKI that issues credentials, which
are then used to authenticate messages and the corre-
sponding information, using a security mechanism like
digital signatures. Node-centric mechanisms can further
be divided into behavioral and trust-based mechanisms.
Behavioral mechanisms inspect a node’s observable
behavior (but not the information it is sending) and try to
derive a metric that identifies how well a node behaves.
For instance, a behavioral mechanism may inspect rates
at which a neighboring node sends packets and decide
whether a node significantly exceeds a “normal rate,”
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Fig. 1. Taxonomy of misbehavior detection.
which would then be considered as misbehavior. This
approach is particularly common in WSNs, and is some-
times referred to as a Watchdog mechanism. However,
attempts have been made to distribute these ideas in such
a way that the need for a trusted node is removed, with
the goal that a Watchdog mechanism can be used in
VANETs [9].
On the other hand, trust-based mechanisms inspect the
past and present behavior of a node and use this to derive
a probability for future misbehavior. The assumption is
that a node who behaved correctly in the past is more
likely to behave correctly in the future. Essentially, this
boils down to some form of reputation management
scheme where correct behavior increases the reputation
while misbehavior reduces it. These mechanisms are
commonly used for reporting and local revocation of
nodes in a VANET, for example through LEAVE [10].
In contrast to those node-centric mechanisms, the
second major category, namely data-centric misbehavior
detection, subsumes all mechanisms that directly inspect
the disseminated information to detect potential misbe-
havior. While data-centric mechanisms do not primarily
care about the identities of individual nodes, they often
still require some form of linking between messages to
be able to reliably distinguish between different hosts.
However, these mechanisms do not depend on the link-
ability of messages, which makes them highly valuable
for the detection of Sybil attacks. Sybil attacks are a
type of attack where a node replicates itself arbitrarily
to undermine the honest majority assumption. Due to
the strong privacy requirements in VANETs compared
to other cyber-physical systems, which makes linkage
between different messages more difficult, concerns for
Sybil attacks are particularly relevant. In response to this,
many VANET researchers have developed novel schemes
to perform data-centric misbehavior detection; these can
be divided further into consistency and plausibility mech-
anisms.
Of these two types, consistency mechanisms rely more
strongly on protection against sybil attacks. The purpose
of consistency mechanisms is to compare measurements
from different entities to detect and, where possible,
resolve conflicts between these measurements. For in-
stance, in a VANET, a single vehicle could report a
severe traffic jam while other vehicles report free flow of
traffic. A consistency-based mechanism would use such
information to conclude that there is likely no traffic jam
and that the single vehicle may have misbehaved or be
faulty.
Finally, plausibility checking mechanisms are all
mechanisms that have some implicit or explicit model of
the real world and check whether incoming information
is plausible within this model. For instance, in VANETs,
speed reports of 700 km/h are not very plausible and may
be filtered out. However, plausibility should be applied
with caution in VANETs, as part of the focus of such
networks is to detect outliers that indicate important, but
rare, events, such as collisions between vehicles.
Note that no single mechanism alone will likely
provide a convincing misbehavior detection mechanism
that detects all forms and types of misbehavior. In-
stead, mechanisms will likely be combined. For instance,
consider the following as an example for a combined
approach. First, a number of data-centric mechanisms
work on the same knowledge base to jointly detect incor-
rect data. Results are then augmented using behavioral
mechanisms that check whether nodes behave according
to protocol specifications. All these mechanisms are then
used as input to a node-centric reputation management
system that determines whether nodes show long-term
misbehavior. These misbehaving nodes can then be
reported to a central authority, which can determine
whether nodes should be removed from the network;
meanwhile, the nodes can be revoked temporarily by
the nodes that detected the misbehavior. In the case
of VANETs, the latter is particularly important, as this
provides protection against determined attackers that
may not be discouraged by high fines.
Based on our categorization, we are currently prepar-
ing a broad literature study on misbehavior detection in
both VANETs and other CPSs. Our goal is to identify
general patterns for misbehavior that work across specific
application domains and scenarios, and can be re-used
for a generic misbehavior detection architecture. This
will allow application of security mechanisms developed
for VANETs to be applied to a broader spectrum of prob-
lems, and could lead to security mechanisms developed
for other CPSs to be applied to VANETs, furthering the
safety and security of both.
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